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Preface
The 2004 election was a disaster. For all the unity that could have come from 2001, the
election results shattered any hope that the country had overcome its fractures. The winner
needed to find a way to unite a country that could not be more divided. In Afghanistan’s Panjshir
Province, runner-up Yunis Qanooni received 95.0% of the vote. In Paktia Province, incumbent
Hamid Karzai received 95.9%. Those were only two of the seven provinces where more than
90% or more of the vote went to a single candidate. Two minor candidates who received less
than a tenth of the total won 83% and 78% of the vote in their home provinces. For comparison,
the most lopsided state in the 2004 United States was Wyoming, with 69% of the vote going to
Bush. This means Wyoming voters were 1.8 times as likely to vote for Bush as were
Massachusetts voters. Paktia voters were 120 times as likely to vote for Karzai as were Panjshir
voters. While Wyoming composes .2% of the American population, those 7 provinces represent
a full sixth of Afghanistan.
The crisis which presents itself when a population is so divided that 90% of one region
will vote against 90% of another is staggering. But it reflects Afghanistan’s history. The electoral
partition fell along ethnic lines. Every province that voted 90% or more for one candidate was
90% or more one ethnicity. The country’s ethnicities, which this paper will discuss in far greater
detail later, are a cacophony of dissimilar peoples left just outside the great empires of the world.
Four of the largest five ethnic groups, who together compose 90% of the population, have
independent homelands on the other side of Afghanistan’s borders. The country is the antithesis
of a melting pot. It’s a dissonance of peoples whose circumstances left them out of their
independent nation-states. Afghanistan is an empire without an emperor.

The country’s historical leaders have served only their own people, without exception at
the expense of the country’s other peoples. This history has turned the opinions of the various
peoples from disinterest in one other to disdain and distrust. But from the discord, a semblance of
unity must emerge. The search for what possible element these peoples share beyond location
and circumstance is not an easy one, but it is crucial for the country’s stability. Afghans will find
what they share in neither language, nor ethnicity, nor race, nor history, nor religion. Rather all
of these traditional bonds of nations have served only to further decay Afghanistan.
For the past decade, American policy has centered on the belief that the spread of
democracy brings with it the spread of peace. The policy is based on the America’s fundamental
conviction that democracy can unite a country’s factions, be they regional, religious, or ethnic. A
government which offers a spot for all members of society, whose rulers appeal to all elements,
inherently reflects that society. When all members have a stake in the government, they find
something they share. A democratic Afghanistan would mean a transformation of the historic
Afghanistan. Instead of one people succeeding at the expense of another, in a democratic
Afghanistan one people can succeed only with another. Though the people still would not share a
language, a religion, or a history, their shared democracy would make them a nation.
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Introduction
The strength of democracy as a form of government can find no better place to test its
power than Afghanistan. The country of 28 million is exceedingly impoverished and has yet to
develop a strong national identity. Tribal, local, and ethnic allegiances still dominate the country.
The country is among the most ethnically diverse in the world. It has with no majority. Each of
the four largest ethnic groups represents at least 9% of the population. The remaining ethnicities
make up 10% of the population. The role of space is perhaps more crucial in Afghanistan than
anywhere else in the world. Whereas most of the developing world has a rural-urban dichotomy,
Afghanistan adds a third element, the nomad, representing up to 30% of the total population,
while city dwellers represent only 25%.Change in space is occurring rapidly in the country,

however, and over the past five years, Afghanistan has seen a 5% increase in urbanization, the 4th
highest in the world.1
Afghanistan therefore offers the perfect opportunity to test the ability of democracy to
overcome factions, and the role of space in developing that national identity. The result is
essential to the future of Afghanistan and a test on the viability of American foreign policy. The
Taliban, discussed in much greater detail later, are an ethnic and spatial movement, born in
opposition to the growing power of rival ethnicities from opposite ends of the country. Their
support comes from those who value their ethnicity and locality over their nation. The civil war
which ripped apart the country for three decades and whose legacy continues to the haunt the
people finds its roots in Afghanistan’s ethnic fractures and the competition for space those
fractures engender. The stability of the country, allegiance to the Kabul Government, and the
popular demise of the Taliban rely on the people’s commitment to a nation.
To test the improvements or lack thereof in national identity, this paper will look to the
Afghan elections as a reflection of the nation-building process. A vote for a candidate of another
ethnicity represents the will to put that ethnicity in power, despite knowledge of the history. An
increase in the number of Afghans voting outside their ethnicity, therefore, is an indicator of
greater trust in other ethnicities, and a belief that other subnational groups can contribute to the
nation and will represent their interests. The paper will relate the election results to the ethnicity
of candidates using spatial analysis, controlling for a candidate’s home province, religion, and
the issues on which he campaigned. The paper will compare the 2004 results with the 2009
election results. The central claim made from the results is that a stronger sense of nation is
present in Afghanistan now than it was five years ago, and that voters are less likely to vote base
on ethnicity or space in 2009 than they were in 2005.

Literature Review
Nationalism
Perhaps no force has more powerfully shaped the world over the past two centuries than
that of the nation. The conviction in a union transcending class and time has bound peoples and
ripped them apart. The embodiment of the nation in the government has lent tremendous weight
to government’s power. Governments which can implement national identities with dexterity run
the world—the United States, France, and Russia among them—those that cannot run case
studies in chaos—the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Balkans, and, of course, Afghanistan.
Political unity has been the strength of the nation and made it a mainstay of modern society.
Soldiers before the rise of nationalism fought only for money, and citizens pledged loyalty only
at the whim of the empowered. Nationalism gave the people a personal reason to pledge loyalty
and a desire to fight. Nationalism has been the end goal of any government seeking a harmonious
land, lending the people a sense of commonality and shared interests.
The study of how to attain a national consciousness, and how they have developed in the
past, has become of crucial importance, particularly in the third world. A quick look at a map of
Europe, Central, or East Asia reveals what is the most powerful force in developing national
consciousness. Delicately carved borders sought to contain colinguists. The reasoning goes that
people with a shared language must have a shared ancestry (the proto-tribe who disseminated the
language and its speakers), and thus a shared culture, history, often religion, and finally, a shared
homeland. It only follows that those with a shared language and heritage should share a ruler,
share in battle, share in success, and share in failure. The notion of nationalism began in the late
18th century, often attributed to the French Revolution. The decades long war ended provincial
identities, as soldiers representing provinces throughout the country fought together. It

diminished the role of the church. Government now worked in French and not Latin. The
aristocracy began to speak the language of the people, rather than that of the aristocracy of
Austria and Spain.2
But perhaps more important than the fall of church power was the change in pedagogy
and control over media.3 What little education was to be had before the 19th century came from
the church, from Catholic day schools and seminaries. What little information about the outside
world was received by townsfolk was offered by priests. The rise of government-mandated
universal public education forever altered these crucial factors in nation-building. By providing
public education, the state now gained the ability to tell its own version of history. Whereas the
church told a Christian-view of history, the new public schools told a nationalist view of history.
The Catholic hero-kings of Spain became villains in English and Portuguese history, as did
German kings in French history. A shared sense of history brought the valuable idea of ‘the
other’ into the minds of all members of the nation. The family across the border had committed
unspeakable atrocities, while the family across the country had shared in the homeland’s noble
defense.4
Education’s influence on the nation extended far beyond its crafting a history.
Education’s most important role was its proliferation of literacy and standardization of the
language to the capital’s dialect. With all students learning that the speech of the capital was the
benchmark against which their own language would measure, the words of the capital carried
even greater weight. With the standardization of language, Czech was no longer a prism bleeding
into Polish and Slovak at its frontiers, rather it was distinct and separate. As mass media began to
take hold, literate populaces had their views crafted by media unique to their own country. The

advent of public education had given control of the world view of a people to their government
and made that view distinct and separate from any other nation.5
Ethnicities of Afghanistan
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Diversity has undermined Afghanistan’s attempts at nation-building. Within its borders
there is no ethnic majority, there are two ethnicities composing at least a quarter of the
population, and as many as five composing at least five percent. The diversity is a result of

Afghanistan’s location at the peripheries of the world’s great empires. Proto-Aryans, Persians,
Turks, Mongols, and Indians have all conquered Afghanistan and their descendants fill the land.
Thus, it is common to find Afghans who look Northern European, South Asian, East Asian, and
Southern European all in the same province. The four major ethnicities of the country are
Pushtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. The lines between ethnicities are distinct, based either on
language, religion, or race.
The Tajiks are alternately described as Persians, Bactrians, and Persianized Uzbeks. The
Tajik Samanid Empire, and their capital of Bukhara, once represented the highest level of human
achievement. But the Turkic Ghaznavid Empire ravaged the empire, in the 10th century pushing
its wealth, knowledge, and power west. The Tajiks’ flirtation with the Persianate won them
Persian language and urbanity.6 Their space reveals their history; they connect Persian Iran in
the east to independent (formerly Soviet) Tajikistan in the north. They are the most urban
ethnicity in Afghanistan, with 14 of the 20 largest cities overwhelmingly Tajik, including 4 of
the largest 5.7 The ones discussed in this essay will be Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kunduz. With
the urbanization of the Tajiks ended the strength of their tribal allegiances.8 Loyalties related to
space remain, though; the Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul are especially cohesive,
even after migrating to the cities.9 The urbanization of the Tajiks has also given them education,
leading to their filling of what little bureaucratic positions were available, including military
offices, but generally precluded them from army ranks.10
Perhaps no country has two more complimentary major ethnicities than does
Afghanistan. If the Tajiks are the country’s ying, then the Pushtuns are its yang. The parallels are
as clear as north and south, as subtle as attire. The illiteracy accompanying tribal life has left
history little details of the Pushtuns’ origins. The first mention of Pushtuns comes from the Arab

traveler Ibn Battuta in the 14th Century, though he refers to them as a ‘type of Persian,’ reflecting
the people who dominated their land for millennia.11 But whereas the Tajiks had adopted the
Persians as their own (if they themselves are not Persians), the Pushtuns remained fiercely
independent. They showed little interest in joining Persian hierarchy or culture, remaining to
their mountainous homeland in the Hindu Kush. Rather, they paid tribute to the armies of Persia
and continued their traditional nomadic lifestyle, traversing the trade routes between Herat,
Kabul, and Kandahar – the only major Pushtun city. Their rugged lifestyle necessitated strict
tribal loyalty, which in time has led to 60 major tribes and 300 clans.12 The most major of these
are Ghilzai, who reside between Kandahar and Peshawar, the Abdalis or Durranis who reside
near Herat, and the Mohammedzais also of the west.
Though easily the plurality of Afghanistan, they do not come especially close to a
majority, representing between 36%-42% of the population.13 The Pushtuns, nonetheless, are the
eponymous ethnic group of Afghanistan. The archaic term for Pushtuns, ‘Afghan’ does not
become conflated with Pushtun until the past century. Distinctions between the two are unclear,
but usually fell on tribal lines and were exaggerated by Britons hoping to emphasize the
difference between Pashto-speakers living in their territory and across the border. But as notions
of linguistic-based nationalism entered Afghanistan and Pakistan, the similarity of Pushtuns on
both sides of the border was reasserted, and a Pushtun-nationalist movement, called the
Pakhtunistan movement, began to emerge. 14 The Taliban are arguably the heirs of this
movement.
The dichotomy of Pushtuns and Tajiks would seem to leave little room for others, but the
two represent only two-thirds15 of the country. Perhaps the only commonality of the remaining
third is that logic finds little reason for them to be there. The Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Farsiwans16

all have neighboring independent and eponymous nations like the Tajiks and Pushtuns, and the
nationalist movements of those nations have worked to undercut any nationalism in Afghanistan.
The Uzbeks and Turkmens, like the Tajiks, were left on the other side of Russian expansion into
Central Asia. Both groups are Turks who came to the formerly Persian region during the 13th and
14th centuries. The national hero of the Uzbeks is the scorn of the Tajiks, Timurlane who
brutalized the Persian-speaking empires of the region. Despite the differing interpretations of
history, the Uzbeks have historically had a good relationship with the Tajiks. Soviet Uzbekistan
originally included Tajikistan, and Uzbek history books claimed the Tajiks were simply Persianspeaking Uzbeks. The Uzbeks of Afghanistan are the only ethnicity without a significant
population in the capital and have traditionally been left out of the bureaucracy, military, and
national politics in general, with Pushtun king caring only enough that the Uzbeks pay their
mandatory tribute and keep to themselves.
Afghanistan’s only two ethnicities of import without populations in adjacent countries are
the Hazaras and Aimaks. The Hazaras are the descendants of the Mongols who came with
Genghis Khan. Their name means one-thousand, the number in their regimental divisions. The
Hazaras since settling in Afghanistan have adopted Persian language, but have retained their East
Asian culture, attire, and features. Under the Safavid Empire, the Hazaras converted to Shiite
Islam, and today compose half of the country’s Shiite population, though they are the only
ethnicity that is homogenously that sect.
An Ethnic History of Afghanistan until 1979
For most of its history, the north half of Afghanistan was firmly part of Persia.
Zarathustra, the originator of religion of the Achaemenid and Sassanid Empires, was born in
Afghanistan. The western half of the country is Khorasan, one of the most important provinces in

Persian Empires. Its capital, Heart, is the home of three of the Persian Empire’s greatest rulers,
and the tombs of Persian poets and mystics dominate the cityscape. Afghanistan has hosted the
countless peoples who have invaded the Persian Empire, only to adopt Persian culture as their
own, most notably the Turks and the Mongols. From the Persian territories now considered
Afghanistan, these peoples continued to conquer the remainder of the Iranian Plateau. When
Western Iranian Empires arose, among their first missions was to solidify their control over
Afghanistan, the furthest reach of their homeland.17
So in the 18th century, the Safavid Persian Empire controlled Afghanistan like they did all
of the Iranian Plateau. The Safavids were different than their predecessors, though. Originating
in a Sufi sect of the Caucuses, they intricately wove Shiism into their government, enforcing
conversion among their subjects. But the Persians of Khorasan would not oblige, and for the first
time there was a rift between Afghanistan and Iran outside the pronunciation of ‘v.18’ Jumping
on the dissent were the Pushtuns of the south. The nomads had formerly kept to themselves,
paying the obligatory tribute to the Persian kings, but not doing much else. But under the lead of
Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Pushtuns united. The Safavid’s heirs the Asfarhids were disintegrating
and could barely hold onto to interior provinces, let alone the frontiers. Durrani attacked Kabul,
and all its environs soon fell. Before the tribesman could gain a full understanding of what had
happened, he was in control of a vast empire of Persians, Turks, Mongols, Hindus, and Sikhs.
The Pushtuns relied on the entrenched urban Persian bureaucracy to run the country, as they had
little experience beyond running tribes, and kept Persian as the language of administration. The
Pushtun leaders had learned from their tribal days not to trust others with arms and filled the
army with their own ranks.19

Soon after Durrani’s death, the ascendant Qajar Dynasty in Iran attempted to reclaim the
territory, but failed without the support of the Sunni Persians, who were quickly developing a
separate identity as Tajiks. The Shiite and Persian-speaking Hazaras backed the invasions,
earning them the contempt of the Pushtun rulers and bringing to the forefront of the minds of the
Durrani kings the difficulties of ruling such a diverse empire. The Durranis began installing
Pushtun military garrisons throughout the country. Their emphasis was in Hazarajat, the
traditional homeland of the Hazaras, but the incursions led only to further tensions, and Hazara
insurrections became constant.20 The Pushtun answer was to dispossess the Hazaras of their land
and give it to members of their own tribes. The Pushtuns pursued the same efforts across the
country, ensuring every corner would have elements loyal to the central Kabuli and Pushtun
government.
But the dominance of the ‘uncivilized’ nomads did not bode well among the Tajiks who
considered themselves among the progenitors of civilization. When the aims of Britain and
Russia focused on Afghanistan, the nation’s factions quickly pledged their loyalty outside their
borders. The Russians had conquered half of the traditional homeland of the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and
Turkmen. The British had conquered half of the homeland of the Pushtuns. Who would finish
their conquests first dominated the foreign politics of both countries and would soon do the same
to Afghanistan. In 1844, fearing Kabuli loyalty to Russia, Britain invaded through their Pushtunterritory in India. The Durranis in power mobilized the tribes of Pakhtunistan. The strength of
tribal loyalty bore itself, and the British believed the entire country—women, children, and all—
were out to end the invasion. The British noted that both the Hazaras and Tajiks were quick to
lend the invaders support, but with Pushtun military hegemony, the support of the Persianspeakers was little aid to the British.21

Rather, it would only offend the Pushtun leaders. By the end of the 19th century, Westernbased notions of the nation-state had begun to enter Afghanistan. Seeing the disloyalty of their
client ethnicities, the process of Pushtunization expanded. Kabul was once a Tajik trading post in
the middle of Hazarjat. But the Pushtun kings feared their enveloping by their greatest foe. They
again confiscated the lands of Hazaras, employed members of their own tribes in their cabinets,
and settled their people as far north as Jawzjan. Pushtuns now compose at least 10% of the
population in all but 4 provinces. The kings sought no diversification of their homelands,
however, and the only non-Pushtuns in the south of the country are the indigenous and isolated
Baloch.22
The placement of Pushtuns throughout the country had little effect on loyalty, however.
When the British invaded on similar pretexts in 1892, they found the Tajiks and Hazaras again
willing to help. This time, fractures within the tribal structure meant Kabul could not muster the
same fight it had fifty years before. The British installed their own client on the throne, again a
Pushtun, and took control over Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. The leader, Abd ar-Rahman, took
out the frustration of the impotence the British imposed upon him on the hapless Hazaras, just as
his predecessors had. When they rebelled in 1898, he massacred the townspeople of Hazarajat.
He took to Pushtinzation with greater drive than any of his predecessors. With British aid, he
brought in Western military standards and equipment. The military’s control over the ethnic
minorities was now absolute.
Abd ar-Rahman’s son and grandson continued down the same path. They opened public
schools which taught only in Pushtun, brought in Western standards of civility, and Abd arRahman’s grandson Aminullah even outlawed the hijab. For all of Aminullah’s progressiveness,
he was still an enemy of Tajiks and Hazaras, and treated them with the same cruelty as did his

grandfather. Unlike his grandfather, however, Aminullah’s cruelty would catch up with him. In
1928, Habibullah Kalakani, a Kabuli and a Tajik, revolted against Aminullah and took control of
the throne. He capitalized on the dissent among Pushtuns with Aminullah’s secularization,
enlisting several tribes. The Tajiks heralded the event, as they continue to do. It was the first time
in three centuries they had gained home rule.
The same year, the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic gained independence from the
administration of the Uzbek SSR. But the leadership of the two now Tajik countries was
disparate. The Tajiks gained rule of their SSR through a top down decision in Moscow in an
effort to modernize the country and imbue it with communist ethics. The Russians mandated that
Tajik be written in the Cyrillic alphabet rather than the Arabic one and reserved the highest
positions of government for Muscovites. The revolution in Afghanistan was from the bottom-up.
It began in the cities with a strong religious fervor and only gained military strength by enlisting
religious tribal Pushtuns.
The ethnicity of both revolutions’ support would decide their fates. With powerful Russia
behind the SSR, Russian politics dominated Soviet Tajikistan. With Pushtun militants behind
Kalakani, tribal whims would bring his reign to a close. The man he had joined with to
overthrow Aminullah, Mohammed Nadir Shah, wanted his dues. His powerful Pushtun army
overthrew Kalakani in ten months. The ensuing ethnic revolts, a result of the despondency from
so quickly losing self-determination, would define Nadir Shah’s policies throughout his reign.
He pursued Pushtunization far beyond any of his predecessors.23 He was the first Afghan to ruler
to use Pashto as the language of administration. Before the change, Persian had been the
administrative language of Afghanistan since 300 BC, when it was Greek. He censored the
media which was overwhelmingly urban and Persian. He exiled the intellectuals in the Persian-

speaking universities his predecessors had founded. Urban Tajiks and Uzbeks fled to their
independent Soviet neighbors. The migration resulted in strong transnational relations and panTajik and pan-Uzbek movements.24
Britain fretted over the power this gave the Soviet Union. With Britain controlling half of
Pushtun territory, the country’s leaders believed a strongly Pushtun Afghanistan would strongly
ally itself with Britain. Nadir filled his cabinet with his family; his ministries with Mohammedzi
tribesmen. Constant rebellions led to an expanded Pushtun military and the destruction of a full
valley of Tajik and Hazara farms. Nadir would soon pay for his brutality, though. In 1933 while
attending a high school ceremony, a Hazara student assassinated Nadir. The government killed
the student, his father, his uncle, and exiled his family.25
Nadir’s successor and son, Zahir, was unready for the throne, and let the country revert to
its earlier state. The role of Kabul relapsed to tribute collector, and all attempts at a nation-state
vanished within Afghanistan’s border. But to the north, Moscow began encouraging nationalism
in its Central Asian possessions. The Soviets wished to lend legitimacy to their claim of selfdetermined nations and began filling ministries with eponymous ethnicities. Public education
nearly eliminated illiteracy, and state-ran Tajik and Uzbek newspapers created strong and
focused national identities. The atheist Soviets began crafting a Tajik national identity absent
Islam, of a people loyal to their state and to the Soviet Union. Vast industrialization programs,
including the tallest dam in the world, brought thousands of Tajiks to the cities, with the
population of the capital, Dushanbe, increasing 40 times in the first thirty years of Soviet rule,
and 100 times by the end of the century.26
Across the Hindu Kush, the nationalist movement couldn’t have been more different. In
British India, Mohammed Iqbal and the concept of an independent Muslim India had begun their

rise to power. The new nation would take the name Pakistan, an acronym of Punjab, Afghanistan
(Pakhtunistan), Kashmir, and Indus Valley, the largest Muslim regions in British India. But
whereas the Tajiks and Uzbeks were gaining the basics of nation building and pledging loyalties
increasingly separate from their brethren in Afghanistan, the Pushtuns remained isolated from
the modernization to the south. An identity in contrast to Hindus a thousand miles away offered
no charm to the Pushtuns. They continued to pledge allegiances to tribe first and foremost,
regardless of what side of the border they may have been on.
While these nation-building efforts had been taking place to the north and south, Zahir
had little interest in such matters until the waning years of his life. At that point, seeing the
meagerness of the legacy he would leave behind, Zahir began attempts to modernize his country.
But it would take nearly a decade of political infighting until Zahir had a constitution. The
document turned Afghanistan into a democracy with universal suffrage, fundamental rights, and
a parliament. But his political battles had won him no friends. In 1964, his cousin Mohammed
Daoud Khan, a fiercely nationalistic Pushtun who had briefly taken forces into Pakistan’s
Northwest Frontier Province, overthrew Zahir and established a dictatorship under the auspices
of a republic.27
Afghan History from 1979 until the Civil War
Zahir found a patron in the Kremlin, and won modern Soviet arms for his loyalty. But his
Soviet alliance was forcing his hand. The munitions they provided allowed for his ruthless ruling
style, however, his style earned new support for Afghanistan’s communist party, the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Zahir had no illusions that the Soviets would prefer an
old ally to a communist, and he began courting friends in Muslim and non-Aligned nations.

Support from India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan allowed Zahir to continue to strengthen
his grip on power, but with his harsher rule came evermore backing for the PDPA.
By 1978, the party had reached its zenith. It had begun 15 years before, founded by a
Tajik and a Pushtun. Its offering of supranational identity had especial appeal to Tajiks, Uzbeks,
and Hazaras. Zahir’s brief courtship with the Soviet Union had allowed Persian and Uzbek
language literature on communism to flood intellectual circles in Afghanistan. The group gained
its strongest support in the cities where economic inequality was most visible. They set up a
politburo in the fashion of the Soviet Union, gaining popularity among the literate, who were
almost entirely urban. In 1978, on the eve of its defining moment, three quarters of its ministers
were Tajik.28
That moment would come when the party’s Pushtun founder, Mir Akbar Khyber, met his
death at the hands of Zahir. Viewing the death of their leader as a harbinger of troubles to come,
the PDPA acted upon their fears. On April 28, 1978, the PDPA organized a coup. The coup was
successful, but the PDPA was unprepared to rule. They were deeply divided between the Tajik
Parcham faction and the Pushtun Khalq faction. The Khalq, many of its members with Pushtun
nationalist leanings, came to dominate the new government and isolate their Tajik constituents.
When Harvard-educated President Nur Muhammad Taraki met his end at the hands of the
bloodthirsty Hafizullah Amin, Tajik support for the revolution went with it. Amin began
pursuing a policy of extreme Pushtunization, using the military with far less discretion than any
of his predecessors, isolating all non-Pushtun factions in the country. Fearing the undermining of
the communist coup, the Soviet Union searched for an excuse to rid itself of Amin.
In 1979, Amin handed them the opportunity on a golden platter. Amin pleaded with the
Soviets for support in their fight against the Islamic militants. Moscow provided soldiers and

armor which quickly turned on Amin. On December 23, 1979, the Russians killed Amin and
installed the Tajik Babrak Karmal as president of Afghanistan.29 But the Parcham was scattered
across the world; Karmal was coming in from Moscow. He struggled to find support or unite the
fractured factions of the Communist Party, especially among the army still loyal to Amin.30 The
soldiers saw no reason to remain loyal to the puppet leader, so the Soviet Union gave them one.
The Soviets invaded in December of 1979 to lend their support to Karmal. The tanks,
bombers, and artillery which had crushed Eastern Europe and Central Asia into submission could
do no such thing in Afghanistan. Seeing their pious county become a pawn of the world’s largest
atheist country, the religious of Afghanistan took to arms. Tribes, towns, and cities fought
against the Soviet Invasion in a guerilla war for which Moscow had made little preparations. The
communists, with the support of the Russians, could maintain control over the major cities and
communications lines. But the countryside remained strongly in the hands of local leaders. These
leaders could find myriad calls to fight. Some fought for their ethnicity, some fought for their
religion, for their region, and for their tribe. Increasingly, Tajiks fought for lapis lazuli and
emerald mines, while Pushtuns fought for poppy fields.31 32 The disparate interests and
disorganized structure of the insurgents emaciated Soviet and government attempts to squash the
rebellion. The capture or killing of a mujihadeen commander would only affect a few dozen
fighters, and have no impact on the others.
The dearth of hierarchy allowed every faction to gain power and arms. The strongest
faction was led by a Panjshiri Tajik, Ahmad Massoud.33 He won support throughout his home
region and gained funds and armor from raids on the Soviet convoys travelling through Panjshir
from Kunduz to Kabul. Massoud imbued religion with Tajik nationalism to expand his power
throughout Afghan Tajikistan. One estimate put Massoud’s troops at 13,000.34 In 1983, he

established a council for the mujihadeen of Afghan Tajikistan to lend direction to their
operations. By 1985, the Soviet Union refused to continue fighting in Panjshir.35 Massoud’s
success led him further astray from his original party, the Jamiat-e Islam.
The group, orchestrated from Peshawar, Pakistan by Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani, had
been unsuccessfully trying to unite the fighters of the south. The Pushtun fighters, many already
armed, had earned the sympathies of Muslims across the world, as well as the United States
under the Reagan Doctrine. The tribes increased in power as the United States donated more and
more weapons to the mujahideen there, including Gatling guns, rocket powered grenades, and
anti-tank guns.36 They increased in numbers as Arabs, Pakistanis, Caucasians, and Turks
sympathetic to the cause of Islam joined with them.
The Afghan Civil War
After 8 years without progress, the Soviets withdrew, preferring only to supplement the
government with armor and funds. The new model seemed to work for four years, but as the
Soviet Union crumbled, so did its client in Kabul. Without a mutual enemy, the victorious
mujihadeen instantly cannibalized each other. In 1992, Massoud’s Tajik forces, the Uzbek forces
of former Soviet ally Abd al-Rashid Dostum, and the Hazara forces of Hezb-e Wahdat entered
the capital. Rabbani became president of the new coalition government, but had little control
over the country, particularly the south. Even in the capital, he failed to unite the disparate
interests. The Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras who had entered Kabul would spend the next 2 years
bloodying each other and the city. 37
To the south of Rabbani’s control, a new Pushtun movement, the Taliban, was rising. The
Taliban began in 1994, with a strong ethnic and spatial nationalist leaning. The movement began
to end the civil war, now dominated by the fight in Kabul. The Taliban blamed the ongoing

conflict on the non-Pushtun ethnic groups, and proposed that Taliban domination of the whole of
Afghanistan could bring an end to the war. Their nationalist sentiment allowed them to operate
unfettered in Pakistan and gave them the strength to take the lucrative poppy fields of Kandahar
and Helmand, which provides their revenue to this day.38 In 1996, the Taliban routed the
fractious Jamiat-e Islam. They filled their ministries with members of their Durrani tribe, and
dismantled the Tajik bureaucracy, grinding all government functions to a halt.39 They soon
turned their attention to the destruction of Persian culture, outlawing music, television, films, and
newspapers. They eliminated the Hezb-e Wahdat and subjected the Shiite civilians who the Hezb
represented to their fury. In 1997, the Taliban reached Mazar-e Sherif and proceeded to massacre
8,000 Hazaras and Uzbeks.40 41 They pushed Rabbani’s forces back to Panjshir, and Dostum’s
back to Jawzjan.
But the Tajiks had just defeated one of the strongest armies in the world, and they were
not ready to submit to Pushtun rule once again. The Jamiat-e Islam was reinvented as the United
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, or the Northern Alliance. Though still under
Rabbani’s rule, the Northern Alliance now focused on military operation and Massoud’s
experience brought him to the top of the hierarchy. The Northern Alliance began operating a
shadow government in the northern half of the country and resisting Taliban incursions into the
area. The Alliance maintained control of 30% of Afghanistan’s population,42 and won the
allegiances of Hazaras, though they were mostly under Taliban control, the Tajiks, centered in
Panjshir, and the Uzbeks, owing to the loyalty of Abd al-Rashid Dostum. Ethnic support in the
civil war crossed national borders, and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan quickly backed the Northern
Alliance, with Tajikistan providing not only funding, but also a base to the rebels. 43 Pakistan lent
their support to the Taliban, viewing the Muslim Pushtuns as a natural ally.44 Fighting between

the two groups continued for half a decade, until the Taliban’s support of terrorism caught up
with them. In 2001, the United States ousted the Taliban from Kabul and established a
provisional government which would hold democratic elections in only three years.
2004 Election
The trouble of governing such a country is immense. After almost twenty years of ethnic
war, on the heels of centuries of latent ethnic tension, the ability to form a cohesive government
is suffocated. But the new government had hoped that democracy would provide the answer. In a
country with no ethnic majority, logic reasoned, votes from across ethnic lines would be required
to win a majority. So at the Bonn Conference in 2002, when the leaders of the Northern Alliance
and other opposition movements formed a new government, they chose a democratic model.
With US-backing, they installed a Pushtun who had opposed the Taliban, Hamid Karzai as
president, a move to disavow Pushtuns of fears that the Northern Alliance alone would rule the
country. The vice-president would be Mohammed Fahim, a Panjshiri Tajik who was vicepresident of defense in the Northern Alliance.
After two years of priming, Afghanistan was ready for its first election. The election
presented unique challenges outside of the ethnic divisions of the voters. The Afghan media had
only reemerged thirty months earlier, the only well-established agency being the Northern
Alliance’s Persian-language Badakhshan TV.45 The state media, Bakhtar News Agency,
broadcasts only in Pashto and Persian,46 but an exceptionally low number of Afghans have
televisions because the Taliban had outlawed televisions under punishment of flagellation. Each
candidate set up a website, but it’s estimated that only 1.5% of Afghans have access to the
internet.47 Newspapers of all languages flourished following the fall of the Taliban, but low
literacy rates kept them from becoming the standard media form, and the urban concentration of

the literate made the papers disproportionately Persian. Despite the preponderance of new media
in the 2000’s, it was radio, the only Taliban-permitted medium, which was the source of
information of choice of Afghans during the election. There were 26 stations operating in
Persian, Pashto, Uzbek, and English before the election, providing service to 37% of the
country.48 But no agency provided service in all three major languages, reflecting the immense
difficulty of appealing to people who don’t speak the same language.
Karzai was the front-runner throughout the election. The bureaucracy was in his control,
and the selection of one of Massoud’s brothers as his running mate was expected to win him
anti-Taliban votes. Karzai, like other candidates, limited his campaigning because of fears of
violence. Karzai relied mostly on allegiances, rather than issues, as did most candidates. The
biggest rival to Karzai was Mohammed Qanooni, a former Northern Alliance vice president, to
whom Fahim had lent his support. Hajji Mohammed Mohaqiq was of equal challenge to Karzai.
The Hazara was a member of Hezb-e Wahdat. Abd al-Rashid Dostum was originally predicted to
be the main challenger, but found no favor outside of Uzbek and Turkmen provinces. He could
also find no sympathies for his Soviet alliance. Karzai won handedly. Though he received only
55% of the vote, this was 5 times as large a percent as the number two candidate, Qanooni.
2009 Election
Five years with little progress in security or stability had brought greater legitimacy to the
anti-Karzai movement, and in the new election, there were serious contenders for the presidency.
Foremost among them was the Northern Alliance’s former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah. Though the son of a Pushtun father and Tajik mother, the Tajiks quickly adopted the
former Northern Alliance officer as entirely their own. Abdullah ran on a campaign of anticorruption and ending the drug trade. The third candidate was the Hazara Ramazan Bashardost.

Though in exile for most the war, his down-to-earth campaigning style (his headquarters was a
tent) and ability to push the needs of the people through the bureaucracy earned him support. He
ran on a campaign of unity and removing foreign troops from Afghanistan. Dostum considered
running again, but agreed not to when Karzai appointed him head of the military. To gain more
Tajik votes, Karzai selected Fahim as his secondary vice president.
Afghanistan’s history shows the immense task facing the development of an Afghan
national identity. History has bred the ethnicities of Afghanistan to distrust one another. It has
led to the development of strict spatial identities and caused outrage at the incursion of those
identities. The history of the Pushtuns has led to a belief that they are the rightful rulers of the
country and dissuaded them from any power sharing scheme. The Tajiks’ role as bureaucrats and
the importance of their language has given them their own claim to rule as well as a deep-seeded
resentment of the conquering and, in their view, incompetent and racist Pushtuns. The Hazaras’
constant oppression obstructs the development of trust between them and the Pushtuns, and their
near arrival at power at the end of the communist party’s rule only strengthens their discontent.
The isolation of the Uzbeks hindered any sense of inclusion in the nation as a whole. With the
problems affecting each ethnicity, and their opinion towards the nation as a whole, the causes of
electoral patterns become clearer as does the extent of the hindrances to nationhood.
Methods
To effectively analyze the growing strength of nationhood in Afghanistan, this paper will
look at the past two elections. The election results are available from the UN for the 2004
election and from the Independent Elections Committee of Afghanistan from 2009. The paper
will analyze the results spatially. This presents obvious problems, because the test will not
always be able to definitively declare that people of one ethnicity are or are not voting for their

same ethnicity. However, if the test, for instance, finds that a candidate received 60% of the vote
in a province where his ethnicity represents only 50% of the population, the test will conclude
that people outside the candidate’s ethnicity are voting for him. Likewise, if he receives 50% in a
province where his ethnicity represents 60% of the population, it’s safe to conclude that people
of his ethnicity are voting for candidates from other ethnicities. A clear complication is that
Karzai chose a Tajik as his running mate in 2009. However, this means that when a Tajik voted
for Karzai, he or she either preferred a Tajik vice-president and Pushtun president to a Tajik
president, or ethnicity was not an important enough factor to determine their vote.
Because Afghanistan’s ethnicities, excluding Pushtuns, are segregated and live in their
own homelands, the relation of space and ethnicity is particularly strong. Using a spatial study
for Afghanistan is analogous to doing a spatial study of an American city’s election in search of
a link between race of a neighborhood and percent of votes there going to candidates of the same
race. A candidate’s appeal to a certain space reflects their appeal to that ethnicity, and a space’s
vote for a candidate reflects its people willingness or unwillingness to reject identities of space
and ethnicity.
For each province, the study will show several pieces of data. The total vote and the
percent of the province vote will be given. The paper will normalize each candidate’s percent of
the vote in the province to their percent of the vote in the election at the national level to give an
understanding of the candidate’s strength in the province. The percent of the vote they receive
will also be normalized by the percent of the population of the candidate’s ethnicity in province.
This is an attempt to show the loyalty of voters to their ethnicity. The closer to one, the more
closely people of the province voted on ethnic lines. If the ratio is less than one, then more
people of that ethnicity are voting outside their ethnic lines. Afghanistan Information

Management Services, a Pakistani NGO which works closely with the UN provided the ethnic
data for each province, while the CIA provided information for the national level.
Six provinces will be investigated. The first three are the homelands of the three major
candidates in 2009. Abdullah’s Kabul is diverse. Bashardost’s Ghazni is Hazara and Pushtun.
Karzai’s Kandahar is entirely Pushtun. The other provinces studied encompass the diversity of
Afghanistan. Jawzjun is a mix of Uzbek and Turkmen and the home of 2004’s third runner-up
Abd al-Rashid Dostum. Kunduz is diverse. Panjshir is overwhelmingly Tajik and is the home of
2004’s runner-up Yunis Qanooni.
There are clear issues with the test. Afghanistan’s civil war has prevented any conclusive
study of population, and ethnic data is shady at best. Because there was no question on voters’
ethnicity, this test assumes that voter turnout was proportional to ethnic makeup, that is, every
ethnicity was as likely to vote as every other in every province. Afghanistan’s elections have
both been marred by allegations of fraud, but after the dismissal of almost a third of the votes by
the UN in the last election, the vote’s legitimacy carried much greater weight.
Data & Analysis

2004 Results

2009 Results

Nationwide
After the allegations of corruption had been cleared, and almost a quarter of Karzai’s
votes thrown out, the final results showed the incumbent a hair short of the majority. Karzai
received 49.67% of the total vote, Abdullah 30.59%, and Bashardost 10.46%. The total tally of
votes for all Pushtun candidates was 55.69%, and 34.61% for Tajik candidates (Bashardost was
the only Hazara candidate). Adding the Uzbek population to the Pushtun shows a nearly perfect
mirror of the country’s ethnic makeup. The percent of votes for candidates of each ethnicity is
well within the range of estimates for each ethnicity’s share of the population.
But a closer look at the election, however, casts away the possibility that Afghans voted
solely on ethnic lines. Though the map shows a clear correlation, the role of ethnicity is neither
total nor complete.
Kabul
The capital of a country is often the home of its nationalist movements. The center of the
nation, the culture and language which the rest of the nation aspired to is autochthonous in the
capital. Home to the government, the capital’s economy often finds its base in the greatest
supporter of the nation, the government. Universities, museums, and all things of the nation, and
all thought which originates in those institutions, come from the capital. The draw of the capital
brings migrants from throughout the country, and capitals are often microcosms of the country.
Kabul is no exception. Though once only Tajik and Hazara territory, the choice of the town as a
capital for the Pushtun Empires has brought great demographic change, though often through
means of land dispossession and ethnic cleansing.
Kabul province is now 60% Pushtun, 25% Tajik, and 10% Hazara out of a population of
3 million, or about a tenth of Afghanistan’s total population. Pushtuns come mostly from Abdur-

Rahman’s Ghilzai tribe and live on the farms once occupied by Hazaras before Rahman evicted
them. The Pushtuns compose the majority of the province outside Kabul proper, but only a
quarter of the city. The plurality of the city, 45%, is Tajik, vestiges of the old trade routes with
Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sherif. Hazaras represent a quarter of the population, while the remaining
5% are Uzbek, Baloch, and Turkmen.
The preponderance of Persian-speakers has led to Persian administration and bureaucracy
in the capital for centuries, despite Pushtun rule. Coupled with Tajik merchants, this has made
Kabul’s middle class decidedly Tajik, though splintered. Half of the class relies on the Pushtun
government for employment, while the other only relates to Pushtuns in the tribute they must pay
to the government to conduct their business.49 The Pushtun rule of the territory has put that
ethnicity both at the top and bottom of its social structure. The royal consort and top ministers,
their families and subtribes, occupy the highest strata of Kabuli society, while the tens of
thousands of Pushtun soldiers filled the class just above the lowest. That was reserved for the
Hazaras, the object of Pushtun kings’ scorn, and occupiers of the most menial work in the city.
Most importantly for the election, though, is that the city is home to Abdullah Abdullah.
It seemed to be his ideal bastion: the most educated part of the country, a high Tajik population,
and the home of the reformist movement. But Kabul is also the home of Karzai’s employees, and
home of the corrupt politicians and their beneficiaries who Abdullah sought to oust. Both
candidates campaigned vigorously in the capital, aiming to win over its massive population,
while Bashardost tended to stay in closer to his home. Kabul is also the home of minor
candidates, like the Tajik Frozan Fana, one of only two female candidates running.
In the last election Kabul province reflected national patterns. Karzai won 53% of the
vote compared to 55% nationally in a province that’s 50% Pushtun. Yunis Mohaqiq had hoped

for a good show from the capital province because of its Tajik population and because his home
province of Panjshir borders Kabul and most of the powerful Tajiks in Kabul are ancestrally
from the Panjshir Valley. But Qanooni could not gather the support need, winning only 19.9% of
the vote, meaning most Tajiks voted for other candidates. Mohaqiq, with his urban campaign, did
exceptionally well, with 17.9% of the vote, 50% than his national average, and a number three
times as a high as the percent of the province which is Hazara. Dostum made little effort outside
Uzbek territories. Despite winning 83% in Jawzjan, he won one hundredth of that in Kabul,
receiving 0.8% of the vote.
Kabul again served as a microcosm of the country as a whole in 2009. Karzai won 48%, a
decrease of almost 10% (5 percentage points), while Abdullah, winning 31%, did twice as well
as Qanooni did, and Bashardost won 13%. The percent voting for Pushtun candidates was close
to the percent of Pushtuns in the province, a ratio of 10:11. The extra ten percent perhaps came
from the Tajik bureaucrats, as Tajik candidates received a low percent of the votes compared to
their population in the province. For every 4 Tajiks in Kabul, only 3 votes went to Tajik
candidates. Bashardost did well in the capital, receiving 30% more than his national average
(though just 3 percentage points), perhaps a slight to the ubiquity of corruption in the city, and
desire for an outsider. Bashardost, even if every Hazara had voted for him, received a third of his
votes in the province from Afghans outside his ethnicity.
Ghazni
Ghazni, more than any other province, casts aside the notion that Afghans voted on
ethnicity alone and emphasizes the importance of space. Ghazni, like Kabul, Kunduz, and
Jawzjan (but almost nowhere else) displays remarkable diversity. Though in the heart of
Hazarajat, the Pushtinization attempts of earlier leaders has made the population almost even

between Pushtuns and Persian-speakers. Tajiks, who account for about a third of the Persianspeakers, are concentrated in Ghazni city, where they form an absolute majority. Hazaras are
scattered throughout the countryside, concentrated in the north and south next to the contiguous
provinces of Hazarajat. But the Pushtunization efforts of the Shah brought Mohammedzai
farmers to the province, and only border districts are fully Hazara. The province lies on the road
between Kabul and Kandahar, providing the wealth of the Mohammedzai tribes through the
tribute they exerted on merchants passing through.
Ghazni is the home province of Ramazan Bashardost. He was born and raised in the
diverse and rural Qarabagh province in the heart of the province. Despite Bashardost’s long
absence from the region, when he left Kabul, his fellow Ghaznawis welcomed him with open
arms. Bashardost ran his campaign from his home province. His grassroots effort saw a strong
focus in his home region, as Bashardost was reluctant to travel, a reflection of the general
difficulty of carrying out an election in a war-torn country. Bashardost solidified his support in
the country, and other candidates tended to stay away. Abdullah campaigned lightly in Ghazni
city among his fellow Tajiks, while Karzai’s tribal origin won him the official support of the
Pushtun tribes in the region.
The allegiance of the Pushtun tribes served Karzai well in 2004. He won 52% of the vote
in a province which is half Pushtun. The province’s location in Hazarajat did Mohaqiq well, who
won 38% of the vote, his third best showing, and a percent almost proportional to the province
Hazara population. Qanooni offered little appeal to the people of Ghazni, despite the presence of
Tajiks in Ghazni city, and won only 4.2% of the vote, his worst performance in a province with a
significant Tajik population. Dostum made the same effort in Ghazni he had in Kabul, and the
results bear witness to this. He won ten votes.

Just as he did in Kabul, Bashardost managed to overcome the demographics of Ghazni.
He did better in Ghazni than in any other province, garnering 61.1% of the vote, despite Hazaras
representing only 30% of the population. This means Hazara candidates receive nearly twice the
percentage of votes as the percentage of the population they compose. This is the highest rate for
any diverse province in Afghansitan. Abdullah’s campaigning in Ghazni city seemed to be of
little value, as did any loyalty to Tajik identity, as he received on 10% of the vote, a third of his
national value. The percent of the vote he received was only half of the percent of the population
which was Tajik. Karzai received similar numbers, taking in only half of the vote he did
nationally with 28%, slightly more than half when normalized for the percent which is Pushtun.
Bashardost’s success in his home province proves that political capital can extend beyond
ethnicity. Like in Kabul, even if every Hazara had voted for Bashardost, the majority, almost
60%, of his votes would have needed to come from other ethnicities. Bashardost was able to take
away Pushtun and Mohammedzai votes from Karzai, Tajik votes from Abdullah. Unlike Kabul,
where the Abdullah’s town of origin had little impact, Ghazni shows a clear relationship between
space and political capital. Bashardost’s decidedly localized campaign undoubtedly played a
large role in his Ghazni success. He was able to focus on his area and tear away votes from
ethnic and tribal allegiances. Bashardost’s performance in Ghazni proves that place can be a
stronger form of political capital, and identity, than ethnicity or tribe. It proves that those forms
of identity are not all inclusive, and that through vigorous campaigning, Afghans are willing to
break with their tribal allegiances and their ethnicity.
Jawzjan
Jawzjan is ethnically unique in the regions studied. Unlike the Pushtun-Persian-speaking
Manichaeism in the majority of Afghanistan, Jawzjan, on the absolute northern frontier of the

country, is overwhelming Uzbek and Turkmen. At the ends of the ethnic homelands of both, the
mountainous province is 40% Uzbek and 30% Turkmen. Tajiks arrived as merchants along the
trade route between Mazar-e-Sherif and Herat, settling in the provincial capital, Shebeghan.
Tajiks compose only 15% of the province as a whole, but make up roughly half of the city. The
Mohammedzai conquests of the 19th century brought Pushtun garrisons to the province, and their
descendants now form a full tenth of the population. There is a significant of number selfdescribed Arabs who speak Persian and whose ancestry remains unclear.
Jawzjan is the heart of Afghan Uzbekistan. While other ethnicities have many major
cities, Shebeghan is the definitive capital of the Uzbeks of Afghanistan. It is also the home of
Abd al-Rashid Dostum. From his hometown, he wielded immense control over the political
capital of the province and the Uzbeks, as well as the Turkmen. He won 78% of the vote there in
the 2004 election, and 73% of the vote in neighboring Faryab, both percents greater than that of
the Turkmen and Uzbeks in the provinces, though only slightly. Dostum’s appointment to Chief
of the Afghan Army by Karzai was an explicit appeal by Karzai to win over the region in which
he won only 15% of the vote five years earlier. Karzai relied on Dostum to campaign on his
behalf, and Dostum’s obliging made Karzai one of the only candidates with a strong campaign in
the region. Neither Bashardost nor Abdullah had Uzbek or Turkmen versions of their website,
and the two rarely made trips to the outskirt province.
But the people of Jawzjan dismissed the skepticism of Bashardost and Abullah, the hopes
of Karzai, and the hegemony of Dostum. Dostum’s strength was unmistakable; Karzai received
58.0% of the vote, the highest percentage any candidate received in a province in which his
ethnicity did not compose the majority. But Dostum failed to show off the power he had in 2004.
The 58.0% which he won for Karzai is only three quarters of the votes he garnered for himself

five years earlier. Moreover, Dostum failed to garner great support across the province, as the
ratio of votes for Karzai to the sum of the Uzbek and Pushtun populations was very close to one.
Meanwhile, Abdullah secured 27% of the vote, about 7 times as high as the percent received by
the major Tajik candidate in the last election. The percent of the vote going to Adbullah was
twice the percent of the population which is Tajik. Bashardost performed extremely poorly in the
region, winning only 4% of the vote.
With the exception of Bashardost, the results of Jawzjan closely reflected the national
results. Karzai’s percent of the vote was only 3 percentage points higher than his national
average, and Abdullah’s was only 4 percentage points lower. There exists a sense of dislocation
among the Turkmens and Uzbeks of Afghanistan. Not only did neither Abdullah nor
Bashardost’s websites have Turkmen of Uzbek versions, but neither do government websites.
Jawzjan, therefore, represents a valuable test. Jawzjanis could vote neither on ethnicity nor
space. They voted as outsiders. They could vote only on issues and political deals, and the results
were almost the same as they were for the country as a whole. The similarity between the
Jawzjan distribution of votes and the nation distribution of votes means that even without an
ethnic or spatial interest in the election, the national results are still possible.
Kandahar
Kandahar has gained more infamy than any other province in Afghanistan. Home to the
Taliban, poppy fields, and Hamid Karzai, Kandahar’s importance has grown exponentially as
those three elements have come to dominate Afghanistan. Unlike the provinces of the north
which have gained nominal diversity through the conquests of the Durrani Dynasty, the makeup
of Kandahar remains much the same as it was before the unification of Afghanistan. Resting in
the heart of Pakhtunistan in the Hindu Kush, Kandahar has attracted few of Afghanistan’s other

minorities. It is nearly entirely Pushtun. The main tribes are the Ghilzai and Mohammedzai, the
Mohammedzai composing the majority of the region. There are 913,000 living in Kandahar, of
which a third live in the eponymous capital city.
As the home of Hamid Karzai, the incumbent could feel assured of his success in the
province. He garnered 91% of the vote there in 2004, while Qanooni garnered a meager 3%,
Mohaqiq 0.9%, and Dostum 0.1%. Karzai’s concern, therefore, was with the Taliban who have
made the province into a stronghold. Their threats against voters kept away other candidates and
threatened Karzai’s strongest base of support. Despite military efforts, the results were dismally
low, with less than 10% of the population voting. Those who did vote risked life and limb, and
must have truly believed in their candidate or in the cause of democracy.
Of those few who came out to vote in 2009, they did so overwhelmingly for Karzai again,
but not nearly in the monolithic manner they had five years earlier. Karzai won 73.8% of the
vote, a little more than three quarters the vote he had received in the last election. The low
turnout means only 7% of the population came out to vote for Karzai. Despite a negligible Tajik
population, 10.3% of voters supported Abdullah, but again, that’s only 1% of the total
population. Ashraf Ghani, who finished fourth in the election, won 7.6% of the vote, perhaps
stealing some of Karzai’s Pushtun votes, and explaining why the ratio of Karzai’s percent of
votes to the percent of the population which is Pushtun was only .71, one of his lowest showings
in that category.
Kunduz
Kunduz is arguably the most diverse province in Afghanistan. Kunduz is the tenth largest
province in country with a population of 820,000. The province borders independent Tajikistan
to the north and independent Uzbekistan to the west, making its borders split the traditional

homelands of those ethnic groups. Once among the most important Tajik cities in Afghanistan,
Kunduz resisted Pushtun control with greater fervor than most, leading the Pushtun emperors to
send more troops there. The end result is one of the largest Pushtun populations in the north of
the country, scattered across the countryside. Its location on the path between the former Soviet
Union and Kabul embroiled Kunduz in some of the worst violence in Afghanistan during the
1980’s. It also forced soldiers from various factions across the country to settle there, giving it
the largest Hazara populations for any province that far east or north, though Hazaras still only
compose about 5% of the population. The province is also home to several large Turkmen
enclaves, and the Persian-speaking Arabs who were also present in Jawzjan.
In the last election, Kunduz saw the biggest rivalry between Karzai and Dostum. The
former won 45% of the vote, but Dostum took away a full 24.6% of the vote, about the
percentage of the population which is Uzbek or Turkmen. Qanooni again failed to capitalize on a
significant Tajik population and won only 18.4% of the vote, about half of the province’s Tajik
population, but still slightly better than Qanooni fare nationwide. Mohaqiq generally stayed out
of Kunduz, a province in which his ethnicity is the only missing, and he won only 2.3% of the
vote there.
The most recent election saw a radical shift, again questioning the strength of Dostum’s
authority over the Uzbeks and Turkmen of Afghanistan. Dostum’s endorsement of Karzai made
little difference to the people of the Kunduz, and Abdullah walked away with 54.6% of the vote,
1.8 times his national average and 1.9 times the percentage Tajiks compose of the province.
Karzai’s percent decreased significantly, by 29%, or 15 percentage points, to only 31% of the
total, meaning a significant number of Pushtuns did not vote for him. While the ratio of Pushtun
votes to Pushtun candidates was 0.9 in 2004, it fell to 0.6 in 2009, while the ratio of Tajik votes

to Tajiks jumped to 1.8. Even if every Tajik had voted for Abdullah, 40% of his votes needed to
come from other ethnicities. In the last election, only a few Tajiks would have needed to have
voted for Dostum or Karzai for the vote not to line up perfectly with the ethnic distribution of the
province. Abdullah’s success is the result of several factors. Taliban have infiltrated the once
peaceful province, fermenting scorn among the people both towards Karzai who has failed to
curtail the Taliban invasion. As Kunduz lies between NATO bases in independent Tajikistan and
Kabul, local officials have gladly sold out the safety of routes in their districts, and thus the
safety of their people to the Taliban, making the rampant corruption hurt worse in Kunduz than
perhaps anywhere else. Adbullah’s message of reform, therefore, rang especially true in the ears
of the people of Kunduz, true enough to overcome ethnic lines.
Panjshir
As a reward for their continuous fight against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance
members of Panjshir received their own province in 2004. With only 300,000 residents, it’s one
of the smallest provinces in Afghanistan, but it has historic importance as the home of Afghan
Tajikistan's most importance provinces, as well as the home of many of the elite Kabuli Tajiks.50
Panjshir is one of the most homogeneously Tajik provinces in all of Afghanistan, with estimates
placing it in the high nineties. As the historic home of Persian-backed powerful Tajik
bureaucracy, the Tajiks have been spared the dislocation at Pushtun hands that has caused
neighboring Parvan and Baghlan to be almost a quarter Pushtun. Panjshir is mostly rural, but
densely populated along its eponymous Pansjhir River Valley. The strength of the Tajik
candidate in 2004 led the Abdullah camp to believe their victory was assured, so campaigning
was weak. Meanwhile, Karzai attempted to emphasize his employment of members of Pajshiris’
social networks in the bureaucracy of Kabul.

The Panjshir aristocracy had won a native son and fighter in the Northern Alliance as their
candidate in 2004, and they would come out in full support of him, along with their people.
Panjshir showed the impotence of Pushtun pushes into the Tajik homeland over the past two
centuries. Despite bordering the province of Laghman in which Karzai found 85% of the support,
the people of Panjshir cast 95% of their vote for Qanooni, and only 0.8% of their vote for Karzai.
This makes a difference of 106 fold in two bordering provinces. In the US election of the same
year, the largest difference between two bordering states was 1.5 fold. With 95% of the vote
going to one candidate, there was little room for others. Dostum received a negligible percent,
under .01%. The lack of unity among the Persian-speaking communities again manifested itself,
perhaps showing the power of spatial identification. Like in other Tajik provinces, Mohaqiq
received almost no votes, garnering only 0.3% of the vote.
In 2009, the Panjshiris had no native son, but they had another Northern Alliance fighter, and
this time a more nationally viable Tajik candidate. Karzai made remarkable head way into the
region. He improved upon his last by a rate of 36 fold, scoring 30.3% of the vote, while Abdullah
could win only 68.7%. Across the provincial boundary in Laghman, the story was very much the
same. Abdullah had now won 13.8%, and Karzai only 74.8%. Still both were clobberings by
American standards, but a remarkable change. Especially remarkable, the Tajiks which had so
utterly dismissed Karzai only 5 years earlier, necessarily lent a good percent of their votes to him
this year, as the population is almost entirely Tajik. The Hazara-Tajik divide was still present,
however, and Bashardost won only 0.5% of though, better than Mohaqiq, but still close to
negligible. The change reflects the new national tone of reaching out to other ethnicities.
Conclusion

One is hard pressed to find in improvements in Afghanistan over the past 5 years.
Heroine production has skyrocketed, the Taliban, until very recently, were on the rebound,
government authority was collapsing, and violence had exploded across the country. But in the
midst of the chaos, the Afghans showed their commitment to their new form of government. The
Taliban had forbidden voting under punishment of death, and no one doubted they would make
good on their threats. But the people of Afghanistan risked their lives for democracy, and 4.5
million Afghans turned out to vote in the last election.
At first, it appeared that their faith had won them little reward. Violence and intimidation
plagued Election Day, and the following weeks revealed that corruption was as present in the
electoral process as was in every other facet of Afghan life. But after the vote was cast, after the
invalid votes were dismissed, the Afghans could see the reward of their conviction in democracy.
After 5 years under the new system, which had offered services and positions to every people,
the old ethnic fractures have begun to decay.
In 2004, coming off three centuries of ethnic conflict and struggle, the Afghan people
voted solely on ethnic lines. Seven provinces saw more than 90% of their vote going to one
candidate. Most staggering in this pattern was two contiguous provinces, Panjshir and Laghman,
in which the difference between support for candidates was 100 fold.
The 2009 election showed true improvement, however. Though the spatial link between
ethnicity and vote distribution was still unmistakable, its strength had languished over the five
years. In Kabul, the strength of the subnational division of province loyalty was shown to be
weak, as the native Abdullah received the same percentage of votes there as on a national level.
In Ghazni, it was shown that the strength of ethnicity and religion can be overcome, when the
Shiite Hazara Bashardost received the majority of his votes from Sunnis and non-Hazaras. In

Kandahar, it was shown that the power of ethnicity is weakening even in the most homogenous
provinces, a fact recapitulated in Panjshir. Finally, in Jawzjan, a province without an ethnic
interest in the race, it was shown that even without ethnicity, Afghans can still arrive at the same
voter distribution.
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